南北越、美國與“馬尼利事件”
作者：秀華 （ Tú Hoa ）
2015年6月18日
印度支那國際監察停戰委員會波蘭代表團長米艾之斯路-馬尼利及其著作<強者的戰爭> 。網絡圖片
一、何為“ 馬尼利事件 ”？
為促使南、北越免受於一場愚蠢的意識形態衝突，使中共亦不可從中獲利，越南共和國前總統吳廷琰（ Ngô Đình Diệm ）之胞弟吳廷瑈（ Ngô Đình Nhu ）與河內共產黨秘密接觸，商談建立關係。美國情報界將此事稱為“ 馬尼利事件 ”（ Maneli affair ）。在這次商討中，越南共和國願為河內共產政權提供經濟援助，包括稻米、家庭用品和醫療品等，條件只是河內接受公開宣布中立、不加入社會主義陣營並與西貢共同參與印度倡議的不結盟國家集團。 越南共和國承諾將與北越共產實行通商，並努力協助河內擺脫被自由世界國家孤立和需要依賴北京提供各種援助物資的經濟困境。河內在五十年代期間被迫要跟隨毛澤東的“ 土改鬥爭路線 ”，使只在短短的幾年內約二十萬人蒙冤遭殺害。
面對吳廷瑈所作的大膽一步棋，河內共產黨謹慎思量，並清楚知道越南共和國的承諾是真誠的，因為自1954年日內瓦協議簽定後的近九年中，南越的經濟發展穩定。
當收到美國情報人員不斷發送回華盛頓關於吳廷琰兄弟驚人的“ 馬尼利事件 ”的訊息後，甘乃迪總統極為憤怒，因為他認為此是一種“ 殘忍的背叛行為 ”。白宮由此決意不惜任何代價要將吳廷琰兄弟剷除。
可是十年之後，美國又使用與吳廷琰同一的計劃，亨利-基辛格背叛阮文紹政府，與中共周恩來密謀，使越南相繼失去黃沙群島；繼之導致以百多萬名柬埔寨平民遭柬共殺害，逾兩百萬名越南人家破人亡和入獄的代價換來羞恥的和平。那才是前總統甘乃迪所叫嚷一場真正的“ 殘忍的背叛行為 ”。
二、為何又稱“ 馬尼利事件 ”？
馬尼利是米艾之斯路-馬尼利 ( Mieczyslaw Maneli ) 先生的姓，波蘭人，生於波蘭的米州（ Miechów ），1922年1月22日，並後來在美國紐約作政治避難，於1994年4月9日辭世。他是1954年關於越南問題日內瓦協定印度支那國際監察停戰委員會（英文：International Control Commission ，簡稱ICC ）的波蘭代表。該委員會有三個國家：自由世界的加拿大，共產陣營的波蘭和不結盟國家印度。
那時波蘭共產黨政府完全沒有主張干涉越南的內部政治事務，但河內需要波蘭作外交上的中介人，意圖擺脫中國的監視，探討吳廷琰兄弟的戰略意見。由此，馬尼利先生扮演使者的角色，傳達由河內、莫斯科至西貢（ 及反方向 ）的訊息。然而，莫斯科-河內-西貢-新德里-華盛頓之間的政治旋風使馬尼利日愈捲入越南的內部事務中。
為清晰地掌握吳氏兄弟的戰略意圖，美國緊密地跟進馬尼利每次抵達河內和西貢的外交行程。因此，稱為“ 馬尼利事件 ”編進入了美國的情報檔案。
馬尼利事件的結局：1963年11月1日政變後，吳廷琰兄弟皆被殺害。美國總統甘乃迪曾為使吳廷琰總統死亡的政變開綠燈，隨後同年11月，他也因至今仍未找到殺手罪證的槍殺案中逝世。
在河內，黎筍一派亦取代胡志明、范文同派系的權力，掌權執政；繼之1964年，支持越南吳廷琰中立政策的蘇共總書記赫鲁曉夫亦敗在激進派勃列日涅夫的手下。
至於馬尼利先生，1980年代離開波蘭，在美國申請政治避難，並且一直在美國生活至逝世。
三、馬尼利事件內情
難以全面地表述或在一篇短文中概括馬尼利事件中各詳盡細節，因為每個細節均具重大的意義，它關連至越南共和國的悲劇歷史。越南共和國視民族的利益高於任何的主義和宗教，因而導致吳廷琰總統家族的性命，也關連至甘乃迪總統的性命，同時它亦涉及美國的“ 廢馬搶步 ”計劃，使至共產陣營在印度支那取得軍事上的勝利，然後又分歧和內鬥，最終導致共產陣營在歐洲全面崩潰。
然而，最重要的一點，使所有關連至此事件的人士均驚訝，難以置信當很清楚獲知正是吳廷琰總統本人承諾：若北越共產黨接受休兵不戰，並同意與西貢共同携手加入印度倡議的不結盟集團，他立即驅逐美國離開南越。吳廷琰總統以堅定的態度，決意脫離由兩超級大國美、蘇一手製造以及中國蓄意加入這場意識形態的戰爭。吳廷琰總統的主張不但使河內震驚，甚至連莫斯科也感到徨然。
莫斯科判斷越南中立化將是一個極好的主張，因為不費一槍一彈，同時可以消除中共對河內的深刻影響和將美國掃除出西貢。由此越南將跟從印度的不結盟集團，而本質上新德里的外交路線是迎合蘇聯。由此，蘇聯亦可通過印度間接地影響越南； 據當時蘇共總書記赫鲁曉夫的判斷，無論如何，印度的可信度仍比中共高。
至於河內共產黨，打開經濟門戶與越南共和國通商亦是難以實行，因為北越仍存有“ 土改 ”後的餘悸和胡志明隨時被廢黜的危險。因此，河內意圖拖延由吳氏兄弟倡議的越南中立化，使美國有足夠的時間廢除吳廷琰出權力舞台，同時即使河內亦知道莫斯科是支持吳的主張。 對於吳廷琰，他視國家的利益為至上，而河內共產黨則視馬列主義和共產世界為最重要。
四、 馬尼利事件後果
馬尼利事件失敗後，越南民族需要為瘋狂的共產主義、社會主義天堂必勝付出了血肉。 一場由北越共產黨挑起非理性的意識形態戰爭結束後，越南民族失去了一切，只可慘痛地汲取阮文紹總統的教誨：“ 不要聽共產黨所說的，要看他們所做的是什麼 ！”（ ĐỪNG NGHE NHỮNG Gì CỘNG SẢN NóI Mà HÃY NHìN NHỮNG Gì CỘNG SẢN LàM ! ）。
通過馬尼利事件，歷史學者將看到吳廷琰兄弟的愛國心。 對於他們兩人，就是“ 國家至上！”。 他兩人為國家的和平、民主和獨立，不惜冒險，犧牲性命。未來的越南將轉回走由吳廷琰所倡議的越南共和國的道路，他們兩人的形象是我們民族的信心，越南共和的精神永存不亡！
嶺南遺民譯
2015年6月30日
附註:
以下是馬尼利致波蘭外交部（ Spasowski ）的三份密電，也是在馬尼利事件中，吳廷瑈先生意想為越南帶來和平，“ 架空 ”美國，與河內談判的明證。（ [ ] 符號內的注釋是本文中譯者加注 ）
第一份：
（ 西貢 ）馬尼利致（ 華沙 ）Spasowski的密電
1963年8月30日
編號：11266
發送時間：63年8月30日12時
接收時間：63年9月1日9時20分，轉抵解碼部門時間：63年9月1日16時40分
在外交部的歡迎宴會上，意大利和法國大使安排我會晤吳廷瑈先生。他盛情地歡迎我。他說，波蘭是繼法國之後（ 在越南 ）第二個最備受尊崇和熟悉的國家，並邀請與我交談。
托馬斯安（ Tovmassian。[ 蘇聯駐越大使 ] ） 建議我接受。
編號：393
解碼時間：63年9月2日18時15分，由Szopa解碼，Bakunowicz檢閱
馬尼利
( 資料來源: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, 由 Margaret Gnoinska 獲取和翻譯 )
第二份：
（ 西貢 ）馬尼利致（ 華沙 ）Spasowski的密電
1963年5月31日
電函編號：7353
發送地點：西貢，時間：5月31日10時
接收時間：6月1日9時58分，轉抵解碼部門時間：6月1日14時30分
我報告更多關於河內磋商的結果。
1、與（ 范文同 ）總理的交談擬定為一小時。他提議兩小時。 曾詳細討論吳廷琰與美國爭吵所進展的問題。代表自己，他作了非簡短的判斷。他再次表達願意遵守日內瓦協定。 至於南方所關注的是，一個廣泛中立的聯合政府的方式仍可適用。 關於誰將組成右派和中間派的問題，他說：此將逐步具體化，吳廷琰政府中現時的一些人士並非不可擔任。右派人士將只是外國所虛構的，在管治上非有影響力。寮國模式 [ 由左、中、右三種政治力量組成中立的聯合政府的模式 ] 確實不可行，但不成問題。軍事挫敗後，南方政府將發生改變。 至那時美國人和吳廷琰才被迫參與國際會議。 為南方的中立，北方願以遵守日內瓦協定換之。
外交部長請求轉達予南方：在（ 達成 ）政治協議之前，北方願意先開展文化（ 交流 ）和（ 稻米、煤炭 ）貿易。雙方強烈地表示此試行事務將可擴展，在255編號電函中曾提及此問題。
2、總理先生所說的幾乎如上次我訪問時他曾說的一樣，似乎最終也毫無改變。他強調越南的支柱之事。他使用“ 社會主義陣營 ”此詞指蘇聯的角色； 他一次也未提及中國。托馬斯安大使對總理先生的發言感到十分滿意。
3、在所有報告書中都極為明顯地提及1954年的整體模式。中國大使說及新的奠邊府， 外交部長則提及阿爾及爾的挫敗。托馬斯安大使非正式地發現他們計劃將在1965年，於南方動用五十萬兵士。中國為此行動支付費用，餘下的則由當地負責。中國的大量參與使托馬斯安同志驚訝。
4、為我們所搜集到關於在南方戰鬥的特別情報在報告書中確定我們的判斷：雙方力量平衡。他們承認失敗，但仍維持控制75%的地區和50%的人口，即使在某範圍內的影響有所改變。
編號：262
解碼時間：6月1日9時，由Jochimek解碼，Fiutowski簽署
馬尼利
( 資料來源: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, 由 Margaret Gnoinska 獲取和翻譯 )
第三份：
（ 河內 ）馬尼利致（ 華沙 ）Spasowski-Worski的密電
1963年3月11日
電函編號：3175
發送地點：西貢，時間：3月11日12時
接收時間：3月12日12時21分，轉抵解碼部門時間：63年3月12日14時30分
56頁，3160圖；56頁，3320圖
我曾與（ 范文同 ）總理和（ 蘇聯大使 ）托馬斯安作長時間交談。
綜合139（ 記錄 ），結論如下：
一、 總理先生多次強調說他們關於通常的越南事務的政策與莫斯科和華沙的完全相符，即意想始終如一地執行日內瓦協議。實際上那是（ 印度首相賈瓦哈拉爾Jawaharlal ）尼赫魯（ Nehru ）和（ 美國駐印大使約翰-甘乃迪John Kenneth ）加爾貝特（ Galbraith ）所說及的中立。
他們認為，並將不斷的認為日內瓦協議是裨益的，（ 而且 ）他們不想外國在越南設立任何的（ 軍事 ）基地或結立任何的軍事聯盟。
我們對此發言，包括（ 蘇聯大使館 ）米高拉（ Mikolaj ）的言辭是為推行中立，也達到真正的共識，它也如北方在某情況下使用另一種詞彙所表達的意思。
二、對於北方的鬥爭目標，總理先生說，期望建立如寮國模式具廣泛民主基礎的政府。
加強鬥爭力量將導致展開國際會議。 我提示（ 他 [ 指范文同 ]）高布漢 [ Goburdhun，印度駐越大使 ] 的發言說，美國人只可在有面子的情況下才撤軍。他回答說，關注到此必要之點，並說社會主義陣營將確信可尋找某種精明的方式（ 解決此問題的 ）。
三、我將在（ 國際監察停戰 ）委員會的會議上表述以下的事：
a、根據永久組的每週報告介紹各種武器；
b、化學戰爭；
c、南越在非軍事區所作的挑釁行為。
四、若出現破壞行動的反指控事件，我同意將成立行動組，指示由雙方通訊官員參與全面調查。高布漢告訴我，以 ( 法院 ) 律法的方式去驗證破壞行動是不可能之事。
五、托馬斯安告知，中國對（ 越南民主共和國 ）施壓，要在非軍事區內製造事故，但黎筍書記決意反對，並表示他們想對世界展示其善意。 我補充，據我們官員所蒐集的情報和意見， 人們可認識到北越在（ 非軍事 ）區內試圖製造事故。 他們也不明確地在海防 [ Haiphong, 北越城市地名 ] 推行。稍後我將轉達這些事情的細節內容，以及更多關於磋商的結果。
馬尼利
編號：94
解碼時間：3月12日18時30分，由Miaśkiewicz解碼，Bakunowicz檢閱
( 資料來源: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77,1963： w-96, t-1368, 由 Margaret Gnoinska 獲取和翻譯 )
***
電函英文版：
I.
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 30 August 1963
Ciphergram No. 11266
From…Saigon……dispatched on 8.30.63 at 12:00 hours……、、received on 9.1.63 at 9:20 hours Came in to the Decoding Department…9.1.63 at 16:40 hours…………………………………、、
During the reception at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian and French ambassadors arranged my meeting with Mr. Nhu. He welcomed me with ostentatious kindness. He said that Poland, after France, was the second most respected and well- known country [in Vietnam] and he invited me for a talk.
Tovmassian recommends that I go.
No. 393
Deciphered on 9.2.63 at 18:15 hours Deciphered by Szopa, checked by Bakunowicz
/-/ Maneli
[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]
***
II.
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 31 May 1963
Ciphergram No. 7353
From…Saigon……dispatched on 5.31 at 10:00 hours……、、received 6.1 at 9:58 hours…… Came in to the Decoding Department…6.1. at 14:30 hours…………………………………、、
I am reporting further results of the consultations in Hanoi.
1. The conversation with the Premier [Pham Van Dong] was planned for one hour. On his initiative, it lasted two hours. The issue of the development of the Diem- US spat was discussed in detail. He presented his own, not abridged, assessment. Once again, he expressed his will to comply with the Geneva Accords. As far as the South is concerned, the formula of wide neutral coalition government still applies. As to the question of who is to make up the right and the center, he replied: This will crystallize itself, the presence of certain people from the Diem regime is not out of the question. The people of the right will only be a fiction for the countries abroad, without a significant influence on governing. It is true that the Laotian example did not work out – this does not matter. The change in government in the South will happen after military defeats. Only then will the Americans and Diem be forced to participate in an international conference. In exchange for the neutrality of the South, the North will comply with the Geneva Accords.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs asked to relay to those interested in the South that they wanted to begin cultural [exchanges] and trade (rice, coal) before political settlements [were reached]. Both strongly asked that the probes be expanded, which is mentioned in the previous no. 255.
2. The Premier was saying almost the same thing during my previous visit, as if nothing changed on their end. He emphasized the work of the Poles for Vietnam. He used the word “socialist camp,” talking about the role of the USSR; he did not mention China even once. Ambassador Tovmassian was very pleased with these statements of the Premier.
3. The formula along the line of 1954 is more strongly evident in all the reports. The Chinese Ambassador was talking about the new Dien Bien Phu, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the defeat in Algeria. Ambassador Tovmassian found out, unofficially, that they were planning to organize a 500 thousand men army in the South by 1965. The costs of maintenance were paid by the Chinese, and the rest came from local sources. The high degree of participation of the Chinese is a surprise to Cde. Tovmassian.
4. The special intelligence gathered for us regarding the battles in the South confirms our assessment relayed in a report: the balance of forces. They admitted defeat, but they still maintain that they control 75 percent of the territory and 50 percent of the population, even though certain changes have occurred as to the spheres of influence.
No. 262
Deciphered on 6.1. at 9:00 hours
Deciphered by Jochimek, signed by Fiutowski
/-/ Maneli
[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]
***
III.
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Hanoi) to Spasowski-Morski (Warsaw), 11 March 1963
Ciphergram No. 3175
From…Hanoi…、、dispatched on 03.11. at 12:00 hours……、、received on 03.12. at 12:21hours…
Came in to the Decoding Department…03.12.63. at 14:30 hours…………………………………、、
page56image3160 page56image3320
I conducted lengthy conversations with Prime Minister [Pham Van Dong] and [Soviet Ambassador] Tovmassian.
Synthetic139 conclusions are as follows:
1) The Prime Minister underscored several times that their policy regarding general Vietnam matters entirely corresponds with [those] of Moscow and Warsaw, that they want consistent execution of the Geneva Accords, that this is actually the neutralization of which [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru and [US Ambassador to India John Kenneth] Galbraith were speaking.
They considered and continue to consider the Geneva Accords as beneficial, [and] they do not want any foreign [military] bases or military alliances anywhere in Vietnam.
We assess this statement, together with Mikołaj [the Soviet embassy] as a real consent to something along the lines of neutralization also of the North under the condition that some other terminology be used.
2) The aim of struggles in the North, the Prime Minister said, is to aspire to establish a government based on a wide democratic range like the Laotian type.
The intensification of the struggles should lead to an international conference. I reminded [him] of the statement of Goburdhun that the Americans could withdraw only under the circumstances of saving face. He replied that he appreciated this necessity and that the Poles would surely find some intelligent formula [to solve this problem].
3) I am to present the following matters during the sessions of the commission [ICC]:
a) introduction of weapons based on weekly reports of permanent groups
b) chemical warfare
c) provocations [conducted by] the South in the demilitarized zone.
4) In case of counter-accusations about the sabotage, I am to express consent for the creation of a mobile group which would conduct a full investigation with the participation of communication officers from both sides. Goburdhun told me that proving the sabotage by legal [court] channels is impossible.
5) Tovmassian informed me that the Chinese pressured [the DRV] to cause incidents in the demilitarized zone, but Secretary Le Duan decisively opposed this while stating that they wanted to show the world their good will. I add that based on the information and opinions of our officers one can recognize that there were attempts to cause incidents in the [demilitarized] zone by the North. They also acted ambiguously in Haiphong. I will relay details of these matters, as well as further results of consultations, later.
二、對於北方的鬥爭目標，總理先生說，期望建立如寮國模式具廣泛民主基礎的政府。
加強鬥爭力量將導致展開國際會議。 我提示（ 他 [ 指范文同 ]）高布漢 [ Goburdhun，印度駐越大使 ] 的發言說，美國人只可在有面子的情況下才撤軍。他回答說，關注到此必要之點，並說社會主義陣營將確信可尋找某種精明的方式（ 解決此問題的 ）。
三、我將在（ 國際監察停戰 ）委員會的會議上表述以下的事：
a、根據永久組的每週報告介紹各種武器；
b、化學戰爭；
c、南越在非軍事區所作的挑釁行為。
四、若出現破壞行動的反指控事件，我同意將成立行動組，指示由雙方通訊官員參與全面調查。高布漢告訴我，以 ( 法院 ) 律法的方式去驗證破壞行動是不可能之事。
五、托馬斯安告知，中國對（ 越南民主共和國 ）施壓，要在非軍事區內製造事故，但黎筍書記決意反對，並表示他們想對世界展示其善意。 我補充，據我們官員所蒐集的情報和意見， 人們可認識到北越在（ 非軍事 ）區內試圖製造事故。 他們也不明確地在海防 [ Haiphong, 北越城市地名 ] 推行。稍後我將轉達這些事情的細節內容，以及更多關於磋商的結果。
馬尼利
編號：94
解碼時間：3月12日18時30分，由Miaśkiewicz解碼，Bakunowicz檢閱
( 資料來源: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77,1963： w-96, t-1368, 由 Margaret Gnoinska 獲取和翻譯 )
***
電函英文版：
I.
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 30 August 1963
Ciphergram No. 11266
From…Saigon……dispatched on 8.30.63 at 12:00 hours……、、received on 9.1.63 at 9:20 hours Came in to the Decoding Department…9.1.63 at 16:40 hours…………………………………、、
During the reception at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian and French ambassadors arranged my meeting with Mr. Nhu. He welcomed me with ostentatious kindness. He said that Poland, after France, was the second most respected and well- known country [in Vietnam] and he invited me for a talk.
Tovmassian recommends that I go.
No. 393
Deciphered on 9.2.63 at 18:15 hours Deciphered by Szopa, checked by Bakunowicz
/-/ Maneli
[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]
***
II.
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw), 31 May 1963
Ciphergram No. 7353
From…Saigon……dispatched on 5.31 at 10:00 hours……、、received 6.1 at 9:58 hours…… Came in to the Decoding Department…6.1. at 14:30 hours…………………………………、、
I am reporting further results of the consultations in Hanoi.
1. The conversation with the Premier [Pham Van Dong] was planned for one hour. On his initiative, it lasted two hours. The issue of the development of the Diem- US spat was discussed in detail. He presented his own, not abridged, assessment. Once again, he expressed his will to comply with the Geneva Accords. As far as the South is concerned, the formula of wide neutral coalition government still applies. As to the question of who is to make up the right and the center, he replied: This will crystallize itself, the presence of certain people from the Diem regime is not out of the question. The people of the right will only be a fiction for the countries abroad, without a significant influence on governing. It is true that the Laotian example did not work out – this does not matter. The change in government in the South will happen after military defeats. Only then will the Americans and Diem be forced to participate in an international conference. In exchange for the neutrality of the South, the North will comply with the Geneva Accords.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs asked to relay to those interested in the South that they wanted to begin cultural [exchanges] and trade (rice, coal) before political settlements [were reached]. Both strongly asked that the probes be expanded, which is mentioned in the previous no. 255.
2. The Premier was saying almost the same thing during my previous visit, as if nothing changed on their end. He emphasized the work of the Poles for Vietnam. He used the word “socialist camp,” talking about the role of the USSR; he did not mention China even once. Ambassador Tovmassian was very pleased with these statements of the Premier.
3. The formula along the line of 1954 is more strongly evident in all the reports. The Chinese Ambassador was talking about the new Dien Bien Phu, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the defeat in Algeria. Ambassador Tovmassian found out, unofficially, that they were planning to organize a 500 thousand men army in the South by 1965. The costs of maintenance were paid by the Chinese, and the rest came from local sources. The high degree of participation of the Chinese is a surprise to Cde. Tovmassian.
4. The special intelligence gathered for us regarding the battles in the South confirms our assessment relayed in a report: the balance of forces. They admitted defeat, but they still maintain that they control 75 percent of the territory and 50 percent of the population, even though certain changes have occurred as to the spheres of influence.
No. 262
Deciphered on 6.1. at 9:00 hours
Deciphered by Jochimek, signed by Fiutowski
/-/ Maneli
[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, w-102, t-625, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]
***
III.
Secret Telegram from Maneli (Hanoi) to Spasowski-Morski (Warsaw), 11 March 1963
Ciphergram No. 3175
From…Hanoi…、、dispatched on 03.11. at 12:00 hours……、、received on 03.12. at 12:21hours…
Came in to the Decoding Department…03.12.63. at 14:30 hours…………………………………、、
page56image3160 page56image3320
I conducted lengthy conversations with Prime Minister [Pham Van Dong] and [Soviet Ambassador] Tovmassian.
Synthetic139 conclusions are as follows:
1) The Prime Minister underscored several times that their policy regarding general Vietnam matters entirely corresponds with [those] of Moscow and Warsaw, that they want consistent execution of the Geneva Accords, that this is actually the neutralization of which [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru and [US Ambassador to India John Kenneth] Galbraith were speaking.
They considered and continue to consider the Geneva Accords as beneficial, [and] they do not want any foreign [military] bases or military alliances anywhere in Vietnam.
We assess this statement, together with Mikołaj [the Soviet embassy] as a real consent to something along the lines of neutralization also of the North under the condition that some other terminology be used.
2) The aim of struggles in the North, the Prime Minister said, is to aspire to establish a government based on a wide democratic range like the Laotian type.
The intensification of the struggles should lead to an international conference. I reminded [him] of the statement of Goburdhun that the Americans could withdraw only under the circumstances of saving face. He replied that he appreciated this necessity and that the Poles would surely find some intelligent formula [to solve this problem].
3) I am to present the following matters during the sessions of the commission [ICC]:
a) introduction of weapons based on weekly reports of permanent groups
b) chemical warfare
c) provocations [conducted by] the South in the demilitarized zone.
4) In case of counter-accusations about the sabotage, I am to express consent for the creation of a mobile group which would conduct a full investigation with the participation of communication officers from both sides. Goburdhun told me that proving the sabotage by legal [court] channels is impossible.
5) Tovmassian informed me that the Chinese pressured [the DRV] to cause incidents in the demilitarized zone, but Secretary Le Duan decisively opposed this while stating that they wanted to show the world their good will. I add that based on the information and opinions of our officers one can recognize that there were attempts to cause incidents in the [demilitarized] zone by the North. They also acted ambiguously in Haiphong. I will relay details of these matters, as well as further results of consultations, later.
/-/ Maneli
No. 94
Deciphered on 03.12. 18:30 hours
Deciphered by Miaśkiewicz, checked by Bakunowicz
[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-96, t-1368, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]
No. 94
Deciphered on 03.12. 18:30 hours
Deciphered by Miaśkiewicz, checked by Bakunowicz
[Source: AMSZ, Warsaw, 6/77, 1963: w-96, t-1368, obtained and translated by Margaret Gnoinska.]
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